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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY. Agency issues arise when there is a separation 
between ownership and management. The central problem in agency issues is how to 
align the interest of the shareholders with those of the managers. One of the 
mechanisms to resolve agency issues is through executive compensation, specifically 
through linking executive compensation to dividend policy. Many studies have found 
that through such linkage agency issues are mitigated in corporate set ups. These studies 
have been done in US, Canada and Germany. In this paper we examine whether such a 
mitigating mechanism is present in Italy. Corporate governance in Italy is distinguished 
by the fact that a large number of Italian firms are family controlled and with family 
members often holding such positions as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the firm. 
Using an unbalanced panel of 77 manufacturing firms listed on the Italian exchange and 
tracked over the period 2000-2007 we examine whether the linkage between executive 
compensation and dividend policy that has been observed in other industrialized 
countries exists in a family controlled corporate governance environment as found in 
Italy. We find that even in an environment of family control over corporate governance, 
dividends still play a significant role in resolving agency issues. We also see that 
increases in family control of the firm lead to a higher dividend payout. This result 
suggests that family control does indeed impact the dividend decision of the firm, and 
reveals that the Italian institutional environment with higher degrees of family control, 
is also one where agency costs are in part mitigated by their relatively unique corporate 
governance structure. Nevertheless, as we also find that managerial compensations are 
negatively related to dividend payout ratios, even in this family controlled environment, 
dividends do play their role in mitigating agency problems.  
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1 Introduction
Agency issues arise when there is a separation between ownership and management. The cen-
tral problem in agency issues is how to align the interest of the shareholders with those of the
managers. One of the mechanisms to resolve agency issues is through executive compensation-
speciﬁcally through linking executive compensation to dividend policy. Many studies have found
that through such linkage agency issues are mitigated in corporate set ups. These studies have been
done in US, Canada and Germany. In this paper we examine whether such a mitigating mechanism
is present in Italy. Corporate governance in Italy is dinstinguished by the fact that a large number
of Italian ﬁrms are family controlled and with family members often holding such positions as
Chief Executive Ofﬁcer (CEO) of the ﬁrm (Volpin, 2002; Elston and Rondi, 2009). The research
question we set out to examine is whether the linkage between executive compensation and divi-
dend policy that has been observed in other industrialized countries exists in a family controlled
corporate governance environment as found in Italy.
From a theoretical perspective, we posit that dividend policies may be relevant in resolving
agency issues even in a governance environment dominated by family controlled ﬁrms. Earlier
research has found that in more market based systems such as the US and Canada, dividends are in
fact instrumental in solving agency issues. Prior empirical research has also found that dividends
have a role in mitigating agency conﬂicts in a bank-dominated corporate environments like that
in Germany (Elston and Goldberg, 2003). This paper extends the ﬁndings of earlier research by
empirically investigating whether dividends retain their importance as the mechanism for resolving
∗Preliminary and incomplete. Please do not cite without permission
†Nalinaksha Bhattacharyya, College of Business and Public Policy, University of Alaska Anchorage, 3211 Provi-
dence Drive, Anchorage, AK 99508-4614, Tel: 907-786-1949, email: nalinaksha@gmail.com.
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residual agency issues in a family controlled governance environment like Italy
This paper is organized in the following manner. In section 2 we describe the characteristics
of Italian corporate governance and motivate the paper with a discussion of the underlying theory
which informs the model used in this paper. This is followed by section 3 which describes the
empirical model used and the deﬁnitions of the variables used in our empirical model. Section 4
describes the dataset used, and section 5 presents our results and discusses our ﬁndings. Section 6
concludes.
2 Motivating the Paper: Italian Corporate Governance and
Dividend Policy
Understanding dividend policy has been a long standing ﬁnancial puzzle. At the start of the last
quarter of the Twentieth century, Black (1976)wrote :
“ the harder we look at the dividend picture, the more it seems like a puzzle, with
pieces that just dont ﬁt together” (page 5)
The answer to the dividend puzzle still eludes researchers in the ﬁrst decade of the twenty ﬁrst
century. Baker and Wurgler (2004) wrote:
“Despite much study, researchers still do not have all the answers to the dividend
puzzle.” (page 16)
There are three paradigms for explaining dividend policy-the clientele theory, the signaling
theory and the agency paradigm. Under the clientele theory, investors self sort themselves into
clienteles of different payout policy. A change in payout policy will will therefore lead to a reposi-
tioning of investors into their preferred clientele group. According to signalling theory, dividends
act as costly signals of information to the stock market. In the agency paradigm, dividends serve
as a mechanism to resolve the agency issues between managers and shareholders.
More recently, Bhattacharyya (2007) has advanced a theory based on the agency paradigm
in which dividends and earnings are components of screening employment contracts set up by
an uninformed shareholder in order to get the managers to reveal their true productivity. In the
equilibrium, managers of the lowest acceptable productivity are paid the participation wage while
managers with higher productivity are paid information rents. This model, has been successful
in explaining the link between dividend payout ratios and executive compensations in the US,
Canada, and Germany. [Bhattacharyya, Mawani, and Morrill, 2008a and 2008b, (BMM), and
Bhattacharyya and Elston (BE) 2009]. The Italian corporate governance structure and alternative
institutional environment in Italy provide an opportunity to examine the role of dividends in the
potential mitigation of agency problems in a family controlled corporate governance set up.
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The Italian corporate sector is dominated by family controlled ﬁrms (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, LLSV 1999; Bianchi, Bianco and Enriques, 2001, Faccio and Lang,
2002). Faccio and Lang (2002) ﬁnd that 65% of large corporations are family controlled in Italy.
They also report that the value of corporate assets controlled by the ten largest / leading families
measured as a fraction of market capitalization is 20%. Volpin (2002) examines family members’
participation as CEOs and executives in large Italian corporations, both organized as pyramidal
groups and as freestanding (independent) ﬁrms, and ﬁnds that 50 percent of top executives are
members of controlling families. He also shows that when the controlling shareholder is also the
CEO, CEO turnover is not related to ﬁrm performance (while the turnover-performance sensitivity
is higher when the CEO is not a member of the controlling family). Brunello, Graziano, and Parigi
(2003) ﬁnd similar results using a large sample of listed and unlisted Italian ﬁrms.
The relationship between family control and agency problems raises a number of interesting
issues. Family control is often viewed as a solution of agency problems in that the family, with
undiversiﬁed interests, has the proper incentives to maximize proﬁts. In the words of Anderson,
Mansi and Roebb (2003)
”Founding families are a unique class of investor that have substantial concerns over
the ﬁrm survival that potentially alleviate agency conﬂicts. The combinations of undi-
vesiﬁed family holdings, the desire to pass the ﬁrm onto subsequent generations, and
concerns over ﬁrm and family reputation suggest that family shareholders are more
likely than other shareholders to value ﬁrm survival over strict wealth maximization”.
(page 264)
On the other hand, the separation of cash ﬂow and control rights that is often found in fam-
ily controlled ﬁrms via pyramidal groups, shareholders’ agreements (voting coalitions), cross-
shareholdings or dual class voting structures (see Bianchi, Bianco and Enriques, 2001; Morck,
Wolfenzon and Yeung, 2005), allow the controlling families, i.e. the insiders, to seek private bene-
ﬁts of control at the expenses of outside shareholders1. Dick and Zingales (2004) estimate private
beneﬁts of control measured as block and voting premiums expressed as percentage premium over
market value for a large sample of countries and ﬁnd that in Italy the premiums are as high as 37%
and 29% using block and voting premiums respectively (the comparative ﬁgure for the U.S. is
2% for both these categories.). Barontini and Bozzi (2009) examine CEO compensation in Italian
family ﬁrms and ﬁnd that CEOs that are members of the controlling family are paid more than
professional CEOs. Moreover, the higher compensation paid by the controlling family to the CEO
(regardless of his/her parental links with the controlling family) is related to lower stock and ac-
counting returns and this is interpreted as a form of rent extraction, i.e. a premium for the loyalty
to the ﬁrm and for allowing the family to extract private beneﬁts of control.
1Faccio and Lang (2001) ﬁnd, for a sample of 193 large Italian listed companies in 1996, that the discrepancy
between ownership and control (as measured by the ratio of ownership rights to cash ﬂow rights owned by the largest
ultimate controlling shareholder, for corporations with an ultimate owner who owns at least 5% of the shares) is as
high as 0.732 (the second highest after Japan, 0.632, amongst the 14 countries examined).
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Turning to dividend policy, the combination of family control and ownership concentration
often identiﬁes the agency problem as the expropriation of the interests of outside shareholders
through low dividend payouts. LLSV (2000) ﬁnd that civil law countries, including Italy, have
a lower payout ratio than common law countries do. They also ﬁnd, however, that within civil
law countries, rapidly growing ﬁrms (i.e. ﬁrms with higher real sales growth rates) appear to
pay higher dividends. As it is usually postulated that fast growing ﬁrms are more likely to retain
larger fractions of earnings to ﬁnance growth, this result is interpreted as consistent with an alter-
native agency view that dividends are a substitute for legal protection (Easterbrook, 1984). Paying
dividends would thus become the way to establish a reputation “for moderation in expropriating
shareholders” (LLSV, p. 7) that would enable the ﬁrm to raise external funds without leaving too
much money on the table. Faccio and Lang (2001) look at the dividend policy in relation with
pyramidal group afﬁliation, and ﬁnd for a sample of Italian companies afﬁliated to groups that
the correlation between the dividend rate and the degree of ownership and control separation (see
footnote 1) is positive.
The basic premise of the agency paradigm in our model is the reconciliation of the interests of
the shareholders and managers. In a family controlled ﬁrm, we would expect that the impact of
agency issue should be less because the distinction between shareholders and managers is blurred
considerably. It is therefore interesting to examine whether under such a family controlled gover-
nance scenario, dividends still perform any role in resolving agency issues.
3 The Empirical Model
The theoretical underpinning for this paper was developed in Bhattacharyya (2007), which models
executive compensation as a screening contract offered by uninformed principals to asymmetri-
cally and privately informed managers. The contractible variables are dividends declared and the
income generated from a noisy production process. The production function has managerial pro-
ductivity as one of the factor inputs and shows diminishing marginal output with respect to invest-
ment. Managerial productivity is asymmetrically known only to the manager. A screening contract
in equilibrium reveals the managerial productivity and determines dividends declared, thereby also
determining investment in the noisy production system.
The equilibrium result shows that with higher managerial productivity dividend payout ratio de-
creases. The intuition behind the result is that a manager with higher productivity will be induced
to invest more in the production process and thereby having less cash to pay out as dividends. The
equilibrium result shows that managerial compensation is increasing in managerial productivity.
Since managerial productivity is not directly observable, we can focus on the observable com-
ponents and posit the testable hypothesis that managerial compensations are negatively related to
dividend payout ratios. Figure 1 (reproduced from BMM) shows the causal linkages schematically.
<< Figure 1 about here >>
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We start with the basic equation used in BMM.The derivation of the econometric relationship
is given in the Appendix.2
ln(1−PAYOUT ) = β0 +β1COMPENSATION +β2DIVIDEND+β3LNINCOME + ε˜ (1)
where PAYOUT is cash dividends declared to common shareholders divided by net income
available to common shareholders ; COMPENSATION is base compensation plus bonus compen-
sation; DIVIDEND is cash dividends declared to common shareholders; and LNINCOME is the
log of net income available to common shareholders. In order to test our hypotheses regarding the
relationship between executive compensation and dividend payout we test our model empirically,
with the predicted signs for the coefﬁcients:
β1 > 0
β2 < 0
β3 < 0
In order to control for other possible determinants of payout ratio we also run regressions with the
following additional independent variables. These are:
FAMCON A dummy variable for family controlled ﬁrms. In a family controlled ﬁrm, family ties
and loyalties might serve to mitigate agency issues. Moreover in a family controlled ﬁrm,
family members have incentive to establish higher payout ratio as they might prefer to keep
the money with themselves rather than in the coffers of the company. So we expect the sign
for the coefﬁcient for this variable to be negative.
DEBTEQUT Debt-Equity Ratio. Higher debt equity means the management will have to retain
more cash in the company so as to avoid the possibility of ﬁnancial embarrassment. We
would therefore expect the sign for this coefﬁcient to be positive.
MTB Market to Book Ratio. This is often used as a proxy for investment opportunity. More
investment opportunity means the company will retain more of its cash ﬂow for investment.
We would therefore expect that this variable will have a positive sign.
Because the dependent variable is a censored variable we have to use Tobit for estimation.
4 Data
Our study uses a panel of publicly traded Italian manufacturing companies. The empirical esti-
mates are run on an unbalanced panel of 77 manufacturing ﬁrms listed on the Italian exchange and
2The econometric relationship tested is not tautological. We can trivially show that ∂ ln(1−PayoutRatio)∂ Income > 0. So if our
econometric equation was tautological then we would have had β3 > 0. But our prediction is β3 < 0.
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tracked over the period 2000-20073. This time frame is imposed by the fact that managerial com-
pensation data only became publicly available in Italy in 2000, when CONSOB, (Commissione
Nazionale per le Societa` e la Borsa), the national authority ruling on equity markets (the Italian
counterpart of the US Securities Exchange Commission) released a new rule whereby listed com-
panies are required to disclose detailed information on compensation in their annual reports.
Managerial or executive compensation is the key variable in our study. The data for this mea-
sure were collected from annual end-of-year reports using the classiﬁcation system required by
the CONSOB which includes, inter alia, Base Compensation, Bonuses (Monetary Beneﬁts) and
Non-Monetary Beneﬁts. We used the sum of Base Compensation and Bonus as our COMPENSA-
TION variable in estimating the regression coefﬁcients. As a check for the robustness of our results
we repeated the estimate using the sum of Base Compensation, Bonus and Non-Monetary Beneﬁts.
The compensation data is complemented with annual ﬁnancial and accounting ﬁrm-level data
taken from the CERIS database4. The panel we use in this paper comprises 586 ﬁrm-year obser-
vations for 77 manufacturing ﬁrms from 2000 to 2007. There is a large body of literature which
documents the fact that a large majority of Italian listed ﬁrms, even the very large mature ones,
are ultimately family-controlled (Rondi and Elston, 2009, Carpenter and Rondi, 2006, and Volpin
2002). Further these family owners are often members of pyramidal groups where ownership
and control are seemingly separated but members of the founding family keep executive roles.
In order to test the impact of family ownership we therefore constructed a dummy for Family
control/ownership or FAMCOM, based on publically available information from CONSOB which
details shareholder information for shareholders with > 2% holdings.
We started with the total number of ﬁrms with published data in CONSOB, which comprises
77 ﬁrms or 586 ﬁrm-year observations but excluded three ﬁrms for which there was no data on
managerial compensation. We then excluded observations with negative net income, because the
model requires that we use the logarithm of net income, so net income must be positive.
Descriptive statistics for the data are given in Table 1. PAYOUT is calculated as the ratio of
total dividends to net income. DEBTEQT is the total debt to (book) equity ratio, and MTB is
the ratio of the book value to the market value of equity. Industry dummies cover 21 two-digit
manufacturing industries of the NACE (EU) classiﬁcation system.
3 Our sample includes the entire Italian market at this time, excluding only those ﬁrms which were not appropriate
for our study such as those that had less than three continuous years of data, ﬁnancial ﬁrms, service companies, public
utilities and objects of major merger and divestiture operations. The ﬁnal sample totaled 77 out of the original 223 in
the Industrial Companies” Sector of the Exchange as of 2007, or about 49% of the Italian Exchange in terms of market
capitalization.
4The database contains extensive information on 1800 Italian manufacturing ﬁrms over the period 1977-2007. It
is constructed, and updated, at CERIS-CNR using multiple sources. Balance sheet, dividends and stock exchange
data are collected from two annual directories, Le Principali Societ, Indici e Dati and Il Calepino dellAzionista, all
published by Mediobanca, a large Italian investment bank. Extensive information about the ﬁrms ultimate ownership,
group afﬁliation, location, age, and business activity was obtained from Dun & Bradstreet, company websites, annual
reports and other directories.
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5 Results
The descriptive statistics for the data are given in Table 1.
<<Table 1 about here>>
The correlation coefﬁcients for the variables are given in Table 2.
<<Table 2 about here>>
The results of the regression are shown in Table 3
<<Table 3 about here>>
We can see from Table 3 that the two of the three predictions of the model are validated by
data. To recapitulate, our prediction was a positive sign for COMPENSATION, and negative signs
for DIVIDEND and LNINCOME. Regression results using the one-sided t-tests for these key co-
efﬁcients show that the COMPENSATION and DIVIDEND variables are statistically signiﬁcant
and in accordance with predictions of our theory.
On examining the Wald χ2 statistic we see that the equation as a whole is not signiﬁcant when
FAMCON variable (a dummy variable which captures whether a ﬁrm is family controlled or not) is
not included as an independent variable. Many ﬁrms are family controlled in Italy and this demon-
strates that FAMCON is an important explanatory dummy variable and omitting it will lead to the
omitted variable bias.
We can see that the signs of FAMCON and DEBTEQUT are in accordance with the theory
and are signiﬁcant. The signs of LNINCOME and MTB are different from the predictions of the
theory, and fail the one-sided t-tests for signiﬁcance. One possible reason for this outcome is that
the model assumes a linear compensation function and a logarithmic production function. Real life
compensation functions are non-linear and a linear compensation function is assumed for reasons
of tractability. Similarly it is possible that production functions in Italy departs signiﬁcantly from
logarithmic production function underlying this model. Future research would be directed towards
creating models with non linear compensation functions and non-logarithmic production functions.
However, the results of this paper clearly shows that even in an environment of family control over
corporate governance dividends still play a signiﬁcant role in resolving agency issues.
5.1 Checks for Robustness
In order to ensure the robustness of our results we repeated our analysis using several alternative
measures of key variables, for example for compensation we tested results of adding non-monetary
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beneﬁts to the compensation measure, as well as using the ratio of investment to capital stock and
investment to sales as alternative measures of investment, with no substantive change in empirical
results. To enhance construct validity instead of FAMCON we alternatively tested a dummy vari-
able for ﬁrms that had complied with the PREDA or Italian best practices code5. To control for
holdings by institutional investors estimates were also run with a dummy variable for ﬁrms with
institutional ownership of at least 2%. We ﬁnd that our results are robust. In addition, we also
controlled for the level of inﬂation and included time and industry dummies in regressions, which
strengthened our results.
6 Conclusion
The results of this paper clearly shows that even in an environment of family control over corpo-
rate governance dividends still play a signiﬁcant role in resolving agency issues. This is consistent
with the Bhattacharyya (2007) model for explaining dividend behavior. We also see that increases
in family control of the ﬁrm lead to a higher dividend payout. This result suggests that family
control does indeed impact the dividend decision of the ﬁrm, and reveals that the Italian institu-
tional environment with higher degrees of family control, is also one where agency costs are in
part mitigated by their relatively unique corporate governance structure. Nevertheless even in this
family controlled environment dividends do play their role in mitigating agency issues. Future
research efforts could look into alternative institutional and governance structures and its impact
on dividend policy.
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A Appendix
This section outlines the derivation of the structural equation used in estimating the Tobit regres-
sion.The full derivation can be found in BMM.
Consider a linear compensation contract, ω˜ j = b0 +bDDj +bYY˜j .
Where
ω˜ j is the managerial compensation for the j-th ﬁrm. It is a stochastic variable because it is depen-
dent on the stochastic output Y˜j,
Dj is the dividends declared for the j-th ﬁrm.
Y˜j is the stochastic output from a production function given by Y˜j = θ j ln(Cj−Dj)+ ε˜ j
Cj is the cash available for ﬁrm j.
θ j is the managerial productivity parameter. θ j is asymmetrically known only to the manager.
ε˜ j is random noise. Because of this noise it is not possible to infer θ j by observing Y˜j,Cj and Dj.
bD , bY , b0 are coefﬁcients.
From the compensation contract, after substituting for Y˜j we get,
ω˜ j = b0 +bDDj +bYY˜j
= b0 +bDDj +bYθ j ln
(
Cj−Dj
)
+ ε˜ j
= b0 +bDDj +bYθ j ln
(
Cj
(
1− DjCj
))
+ ε˜ j
= b0 +bDDj +bYθ j lnCj +bYθ j ln
(
1− DjCj
)
+ ε˜ j
⇒ bYθ j ln
(
1− DjCj
)
= ω˜ j−b0−bDDj−bYθ j lnCj− ε˜ j
⇒ ln(1−PayoutRatio) = 1bYθ j ω˜ j−
b0
bYθ j −
bD
bYθ j D j− lnCj− 1bYθ j ε˜ j
∵ PayoutRatio = DjCj
The econometric equation that is suggested by the above is
ln(1−PAYOUT ) = β0 +β1COMPENSATION +β2DIVIDEND+β3LNINCOME + ε˜
where PAYOUT is cash dividends declared to common shareholders divided by net income
available to common shareholders ; COMPENSATION is base compensation plus bonus compen-
sation; DIVIDEND is cash dividends declared to common shareholders; and LNINCOME is the
log of net income available to common shareholders. The predicted signs for the coefﬁcients are:
β1 > 0
β2 < 0
β3 < 0
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Item N Mean Median Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
PAYOUT 390 0.39 0.36 0.25 0 0.99
COMPENSATION 357 542.26 375.98 830.13 0 6648
DIVIDEND 390 19834 5250 44261 0 509400
LNINCOME 390 9.68 9.61 1.72 3.69 14.49
DEBTEQUT 390 0.54 0 6.14
MTB 390 2.15 1.76 1.60 0.29 11.79
PAYOUT is cash dividends declared to common shareholders divided by net income available to
common shareholders. COMPENSATION is base compensation plus bonus compensation.
DIVIDEND is cash dividends declared to common shareholders. LNINCOME is the log of net
income available to common shareholders. DEBTEQUT is the Debt-Equity Ratio. and MTB is
the Market to Book Ratio.
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Table 3: Regression Results
Coefﬁcients
(Asymptotic t-Statistics)
Independent Variables Predicted
Sign
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
CONSTANT ? -0.99***
(-2.58)
-0.97**
(-2.52)
-1.19***
(-3.02)
COMPENSATION + 0.12x10−3*
(1.37)
0.14x10−3*
(1.56)
0.14x10−3*
(1.52)
DIVIDEND - −0.23x10−5
(-1.27)
−0.35x10−5**
(-1.90)
−0.42x10−5**
(-2.23)
LNINCOME - 0.25x10−1
(0.6)
0.46x10−1
(1.13)
0.74x10−1
(1.72)
FAMCON - -0.39***
(-3.50)
-0.4***
(-3.51)
DEBTEQUT + 0.19**
(2.18)
MTB + −0.61x10−1
(-1.67)
Pseudo R2 0.006 0.028 0.06
Wald χ2 2.482 14.665*** 25.66***
N 357 357 357
The dependant variable is ln(1−PAYOUT ). PAYOUT is cash dividends declared to common
shareholders divided by net income available to common shareholders. COMPENSATION is
base compensation plus bonus compensation. DIVIDEND is cash dividends declared to common
shareholders. LNINCOME is the log of net income available to common shareholders. FAMCON
is a dummy variable for family controlled ﬁrms. In a family controlled ﬁrm, family ties and
loyalties might serve to mitigate agency issues. Moreover in a family controlled ﬁrm, family
members have incentive to establish higher payout ratio as they might prefer to keep the money
with themselves rather than in the coffers of the company. So we expect the sign for the
coefﬁcient for this variable to be negative. DEBTEQUT is the Debt-Equity Ratio. Higher debt
equity means the management will have to retain more cash in the company so as to avoid the
possibility of ﬁnancial embarrassment. We would therefore expect the sign for this coefﬁcient to
be positive. MTB is the Market to Book Ratio. This is often used as a proxy for investment
opportunity. More investment opportunity means the company will retain more of its cash ﬂow
for investment. We would therefore expect that this variable will have a positive sign. We have
also used industry dummies covering 21 two-digit manufacturing industries of the NACE (EU)
classiﬁcation system. Coefﬁcients for the industry dummies are not reported here for reasons of
brevity.
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Higher Executive 
Compensation
Higher Managerial
Quality
Greater access to
positive net present
value projects.
Higher level of
investment.
Less cash available for
dividends and therefore
lower dividend payout.
Elements above 
the broken
line are 
unobservable.
Observable (testable) link
Figure 1: A Model of Executive Compensation and Dividend Payout-Reproduced from BMM
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